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LAURENCE P. CLAUS* AND RICHARD S. KAY**
Constitutional Courts as "Positive Legislators"
in the United Statest
This Report asks whether American courts that decide constitu-
tional cases, and ultimately the Justices of the United States Supreme
Court, may be characterized as legislators, and in particular, as "posi-
tive" legislators. After defining the terms, the report reviews the
Supreme Court's practice of constitutional lawmaking and considers
academic and political reactions to that practice. The Report con-
cludes with an account of challenges that the Court has encountered
in crafting remedies fit to fulfill the promise of its constitutional
rulings.
I. LEGISLATORS AND POSITIvE LEGISLATORS
The topic of this Report engages two analytically distinct ideas-
legislation and "positive legislation." By legislation, we will mean any
action that adds a rule to a given system of law. ' Historically, Ameri-
can jurisprudence has displayed an ambivalent attitude to the idea
that judges legislate in this sense. Judicial lawmaking is, of course,
an entirely familiar feature of common law adjudication, but until the
latter part of the nineteenth century this proposition was widely con-
sidered heretical. The orthodox view was that what might look like
judicially created rules were, in fact, deductions from a preexisting
body of common law principles.2 By the middle of the twentieth cen-
tury, however, this idea had been fully debunked and there was
common agreement that "judges do and must legislate," although
* Professor of Law, University of San Diego. We are grateful for excellent re-
search assistance from Annie Hu of the University of San Diego School of Law.
** Wallace Stevens Professor of Law, University of Connecticut.
t DO1 105131/ajcl.2009.0018.
1. We need not, for the purposes of this Report, state more precisely what it
takes to be a "rule" in a given legal system. Any attempt to do so depends in part on
certain disputed assumptions about the operation of the particular legal system. See
H.L.A. Hart, Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence, in ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE
AND PHILOSOPHY 21 (1983). The entitlement of the examples given here to be called
rules is relatively uncontroversial.
2. This is not to say that more skeptical views were ever entirely absent. See
BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE: THE ROLE OF POLITICS
IN JUDGING (Princeton Univ. Press, 2009).
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they can "do so only interstitially; they are confined from molar to
molecular motions."3 Critically, moreover, such judge-made law was
universally acknowledged to be subject to correction and revision by
elected legislatures.
A narrow view of the judicial role was even more widely held
with respect to adjudication pursuant to a formally enacted text. Ac-
cording to the conventional wisdom, the job of the judge in that
situation was in no way legislative. The act of legislation had been
completed by the time the courts came into the picture. Their job was
to apply the existing rule to a particular set of facts. In this respect,
the judges, notwithstanding their constitutional independence, could
be perceived as performing an executive function. 4 Thomas Jefferson
expressed this view when he declared that the judge should be a
"mere machine."5 As it involved the judicial application of a written
text, the same understanding extended to constitutional adjudica-
tion. In the foundational case of Marbury v. Madison,6 Chief Justice
Marshall depicted the invalidation of an unconstitutional statute not
as a discretionary exercise of power, but as an inescapable duty.
7
When asked about certain constitutional judgments of the Supreme
Court, Justice Hugo Black replied: "Well, the court didn't do it ....
The Constitution did it."
8
This is a view of the function of courts in constitutional litigation
that has few defenders today. The Constitution, it is reasoned, must
be interpreted and interpretation is not and cannot be a mechanical
process. The preoccupation of American constitutional scholars with
judicial interpretation is well known. It is enough here to note that
most commentators, even most of those attached to a method of inter-
pretation tethered to the original meaning of the constitutional
language, see constitutional judges as faced with inevitable choices in
adjudicating claims under the Constitution. 9 Without regard to the
correctness of this assumption as a matter of theory, no candid ob-
3. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting). The
classic American treatment is BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS (1921).
4. See Laurence Claus, Montesquieu's Mistakes and the True Meaning of Separa-
tion, 25 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 419, 421-23 (2005).
5. 1 THOMAS JEFFERSON, Thomas Jefferson to Edmund Pendleton, August 26,
1776, in THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 503, 505 (Julian P. Boyd et al. eds., 1950).
6. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
7. Id. at 180 ("Why does a judge swear to discharge his duties agreeably to the
constitution of the United States, if that constitution forms no rule for his govern-
ment?"). Philip Hambuger has recently stressed the historical primacy of judges' duty
to apply the law in his thorough history of the development of judicial constitutional
review. See generally PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY (2008).
8. Justice Black and the Bill of Rights (CBS Television Broadcast, Dec. 3, 1968).
9. See e.g., MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE COURTS: LAW OR POLIT-
ICs?, 55-57, 95-102 (1994). We discuss the current state of the debate on "originalist"
constitutional interpretation infra text accompanying notes 53-61.
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server can deny that, in fact, the history of American constitutional
law is, in critical measure, one of judicial choice.
In this sense, judges may be lawmakers, and often are. But are
they in any sense positive lawmakers? We will treat judges as en-
gaged in positive lawmaking when they originate a scheme of law as
opposed to merely considering, revising or rejecting schemes con-
ceived by other legislative actors. As we hope our examination of
American constitutional law will show, this is a question of degree,
not one of absolute characterization. We need to ask, that is, not "was
this positive legislation?" but "to what extent was this positive
legislation?"
This sense of positive legislation resonates with the famous dic-
tum of Hans Kelsen that a constitutional court which can declare
enacted laws ineffective functions as a "negative legislator."10 Kel-
sen's characterization followed from his liberal definition of
legislation as any "creation of general norms."'" A judgment that ef-
fectively invalidates a statute changes the content of the set of legal
norms. For Kelsen, this was enough to amount to legislation. 12 Kel-
sen was clear that such a judgment had "a constitutive, not a
declaratory character."1 3 This way of looking at things was in direct
contradiction to the classic American view of constitutional adjudica-
tion, according to which a judicial holding of unconstitutionality
amounted to an authoritative statement that the statute was void ab
initio.14 A judgment could not repeal or "abolish" statutes. The Aus-
trian Constitution of 1920, in language drafted by Kelsen, on the
other hand, refers to the power of the Constitutional Court to cancel
or undo (aufheben) a law-not merely to declare it to be without ef-
fect. 15 While Kelsen himself sometimes used the somewhat more
ambiguous English word "annul," he was in no doubt that when a
constitutional court held a law invalid it was legislating. 16 In the
same vein, the Austrian Constitution called for a judgment of the
10. HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 268 (Anders Wedberg
trans., 1949).
11. Id. at 270.
12. Other scholars, focusing on other distinctive aspects of such adjudication,
have denied that it involves legislation. See e.g., ALLAN R. BREWER-CARIAS, ETUDES DE
DROIT PUBLIC COMPAR 685 (2001) (noting that constitutional courts use "legal meth-
ods and criteria, in a process initiated by a party with the required standing").
13. Hans Kelsen, Judicial Review of Legislation: A Comparative Study of the Aus-
trian and the American Constitution, 4 J. POL. 183, 190 (1942).
14. See Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442 (1886). As discussed below,
this pristine view has been considerably modified.
15. The official English translation of the Austrian Constitution, in this respect
unchanged since 1920, uses the even more suggestive "rescinded:" available at http://
www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/Erv/ERV_1930_/ERV_1930_1.html (last visited Sept.
3, 2009).
16. See Kelsen, supra note 13, at 187-90. Later Kelsen sometimes used the En-
glish word "abolish." See HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 268
(Anders Wedberg trans., 1949).
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Constitutional Court invalidating an enactment to be published in
the official journal of new legislation, a practice followed in numerous
national constitutions adopting the Austrian model of constitutional
review. 17
Kelsen, in fact, gave little attention to the ways that legislation
might be negative or positive. If anything, his insistence that annul-
ment of legislative enactments amounted to lawmaking depended on
an assumption that there was no essential difference between creat-
ing and removing an official norm. Rescinding a law was legislation
whether it was done by a constitutional court or by an elected assem-
bly; indeed, there is nothing intrinsically more important about the
creation of a rule than its elimination. What does distinguish these
two forms of lawmaking is the universe of possibilities open to the
legislator in each case. The potential agenda of the ordinary
lawmaker includes any form of regulation that he or she can constitu-
tionally conceive. The constitutional judge as a negative lawmaker,
on the other hand, appears strictly limited to subjects already consid-
ered and addressed by nonjudicial legislators. For a constitutional
court to be a positive lawmaker under this terminology would involve
the court in considering, propounding, and creating a scheme of regu-
lation of its own conception.
The formal characteristics of adjudication, of course, limit the
lawmaking potential of constitutional courts. The agenda of such
courts is largely set by the choices of other people, although in some
systems, liberal rules on standing to litigate or the sheer number of
potential litigants mean that there are few important questions of
public policy that may not, at some point, present themselves for de-
cision. 8 In any event, once a court has taken jurisdiction, a
substantial range of possible lawmaking may arise within the scope
of the subject matter before it.
It is worth noting briefly a second sense of "positive lawmaking"
that may be relevant in our discussion. A constitutional court may be
said to engage in positive constitutional lawmaking when the rule it
formulates creates "affirmative" public duties. Students of compara-
tive constitutional law are familiar with the distinction between "first
17. See VENICE COMMISSION, DECISIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AND
EQUIVALENT BODIES AND THEIR EXECUTION, May 17, 2001, available at http://www.
venice.coe.int/docs/2001/CDL-INF(2001)009-e.asp.
18. See generally RICHARD S. KAY, STANDING TO RAISE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES:
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES (2005). Allan Brewer Cdrias has questioned the useful-
ness of referring to constitutional courts as "legislators" in light of the formal limits on
the way courts do business. See ALLAN R. BREWER-CARIAS, supra note 12, at 684. It is
also worth pointing out that sua sponte legal declarations by constitutional courts are
not unknown. See In re 42 Pa. C. S. § 1703, 394 A.2d 444 (Pa. 1978); Wojciech Sadur-
ski, Twenty Years after the Transition: Constitutional Review in Central and Eastern
Europe (Sydney Law School Research Paper No. 09/69, 2009, available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=1437843 (discussing self-initiated constitutional review in Hungary and
Russia).
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generation" or negative constitutional rights debarring state interfer-
ence with private activity and "second generation" or positive
constitutional rights obliging the state to provide certain benefits. 19
When American courts have engaged in positive constitutional law-
making in the first sense, they have mainly produced "negative"
constitutional law in the second sense. That is, they have pronounced
limits on what the state may do. But there is a relationship. Positive
judicial lawmaking in the first sense may raise some of the problems
that have been particularly associated with the enforcement of af-
firmative social and economic rights. In particular, commentators
have worried about the ability of courts to provide adequate remedies
in light of the limited capacity of courts to administer the necessary
programs or to compel others to do so. 20 Kelsen, noting the presence
in some constitutions of provisions "prescribing a certain content for
future laws," assumed that they could have no legal (that is justicia-
ble) effect since "it is hardly possible to attach legal consequences to
such an omission [to legislate]."
2 1
When a court engages in true "negative" legislation in the classic
Kelsenian sense, the remedy of invalidation is simple enough. The
legal system goes on without the law in question. When a court cre-
ates a new legal regulation, however, its effectiveness often depends
on more than passive acquiescence. It requires the active co-opera-
tion of other agents. So, as we will see in Part III, when American
courts formulated certain procedural rules for the apprehension and
detention of persons accused of crimes, the effectiveness of those
rules depended on changing police practices. And when they enunci-
ated constitutional standards for the treatment of incarcerated
persons, it proved necessary for courts to oversee the operation of
prison facilities. These challenges are similar whether the rules for-
mulated impose negative or affirmative duties.
II. How AMERICAN COURTS LEGISLATE THROUGH
CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION
In this Part, we will review the development of lawmaking by
American courts in the process of constitutional adjudication and
briefly consider some of the significant subjects of policy and value in
which those courts have taken a leading role. We will look briefly as
well at the academic and political responses to such judicial legisla-
tion. It should go without saying that we can do no more here than
adumbrate a complex and multifaceted phenomenon.
19. There are now references to "third generation" rights, the beneficiaries of
which are groups and communities. See David S. Law, Globalization and the Future of
Constitutional Rights, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 1277, 1282 n.15 (2008).
20. See generally Ross SANDLER & DAVID SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY BY DECREE:
WHAT HAPPENS WHEN COURTS RUN GOVERNMENT (2003).
21. KELSEN, supra note 10, at 262.
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We have referred to the long-standing tradition of elaborating
law in common law adjudication, elaboration which, when practiced
apart from a controlling enacted text, has come to be universally rec-
ognized as a kind of lawmaking. That elaboration was effected in
opinions issued by judges explaining their decisions. Neither English
nor American courts abandoned that format for decision-making
when resolving legal disputes in which the law invoked was a for-
mally enacted text. American courts have from the beginning issued
written reasons in their constitutional judgments. That written rea-
soning, in the context of constitutional dispute resolution, expounds
what the Constitution requires. Exposition is elaboration. Elabora-
tion is lawmaking. Judicial resolution of constitutional disputes has
added to the words that count as American constitutional law-the
words to which later courts, and others wishing to know what Ameri-
can constitutional law is, have turned to find answers to their legal
questions.
The American founders posited distinct executive, legislative,
and judicial departments of government, relying in substantial mea-
sure on Montesquieu's tripartite schema. But when Montesquieu
used "the Constitution of England"22 as his heuristic for distinguish-
ing legislative, executive, and judicial powers, he displayed no
awareness of the opinion-writing practices of the English judges.
23
His own judicial experience in France had left him aware that dis-
pute resolvers sometimes needed to investigate the "spirit" of the
laws they applied, 24 but he contemplated less need for that in En-
gland. The English, after all, regularly convened a representative
body to legislate, and so could readily rectify their written law's defi-
ciencies. If laws needed elaboration, Parliament could achieve that
through later laws. Montesquieu did not see that English courts
were, in fact, contributing to the process of elaborating law by issuing
reasoned opinions for their decisions.25 They were not, pace Jeffer-
son, "mere machines."
Of what, then, did Montesquieu's "judicial power" consist? Mon-
tesquieu made that clear by identifying those whom he thought were
exercising it. They were . . . juries.2 6 Montesquieu's "power of judg-
ing"27 was a power to resolve questions of fact. That English judges
were resolving questions of law, were writing opinions explaining the
reasons for their decisions on those questions of law, and were receiv-
ing deference from later courts resolving later disputes, Montesquieu
22. CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS
(Thomas Nugent trans.), Bk XI, Ch. VI. (ed. rev. 1873 (first published 1748)).
23. See Claus, supra note 4, at 422-23, 431-33.
24. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 22, at Bk. VI, Ch. III, 85-86.
25. Id.; Id. at Bk. XI, Ch. VI, 182.
26. Id. at 175-76.
27. Id. at 173-74.
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seemed not to notice. Had he realized that English judges were issu-
ing writings that elaborated upon the effect of existing laws and that,
under the doctrine of precedent, later dispute resolvers were treating
those elaborative words as part of the law, there is little doubt how
Montesquieu would have classified the issuance of those writings.
They were exercises of legislative power, analogous to the Roman re-
scripts that Montesquieu called "a bad method of legislation," but
legislation nonetheless.
28
During debates over the ratification of the U.S.Constitution, the
more insightful among the Constitution's opponents worried that Ar-
ticle III's "one supreme Court," vested with the power to resolve all
disputes "arising under this Constitution," might "make" the law of
the Constitution. 29 Alexander Hamilton aptly summarized their
critique:
The authority of the proposed Supreme Court of the United
States, which is to be a separate and independent body, will
be superior to that of the legislature. The power of constru-
ing the laws according to the spirit of the Constitution, will
enable that court to mould them into whatever shape it may
think proper; especially as its decisions will not be in any
manner subject to the revision or correction of the legislative
body. This is as unprecedented as it is dangerous. In Britain,
the judicial power, in the last resort, resides in the House of
Lords, which is a branch of the legislature; and this part of
the British government has been imitated in the State con-
stitutions in general. The Parliament of Great Britain, and
the legislatures of the several States, can at any time rectify,
by law, the exceptionable decisions of their respective courts.
But the errors and usurpations of the Supreme Court of the
United States will be uncontrollable and remediless.30
Hamilton disputed this analysis, famously countering that the judici-
ary would "have neither force nor will, but merely judgment; and
must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for
the efficacy of its judgments. '31 As he must have known, the idea that
courts exercised only case-confined judgment was false, and his ensu-
ing citation of Montesquieu was a mischievous exploitation of the
French theorist's inadequate understanding of common law adjudica-
28. Id. at Bk. XXIX, Ch. XVII, 290-91.
29. See Brutus, Nos. 12 and 15, in I HERBERT J. STORING, THE COMPLETE ANTI-
FEDERALIST 423-26, 437-42 (1981).
30. ALEXANDER HAMILTON, JOHN JAY & JAMES MADISON, THE FEDERALIST: A COM-
MENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES BEING A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS
WRITTEN IN SUPPORT OF THE CONSTITUTION AGREED UPON SEPTEMBER 17, 1787, BY THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION 502 (1888) (No. 81) (Alexander Hamilton).
31. THE FEDERALIST, No. 78, supra note 30.
485
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tion and of the doctrine of precedent. Juries might have only
judgment, for their fact-finding has no significance beyond the out-
come for the parties before them, and the legal rules applied to their
fact-finding are exogenously established. Subject to their understand-
ings of morality in constitutional interpretation, on the other hand,
judges are presented with ample opportunities to exercise will.
Through their written reasons for decision, they can will law into be-
ing, as surely as congressmen and senators do when voting for bills.
And in a system that apportions legislative and executive powers
within a national government and federally between that govern-
ment and state governments, the other constitutional actors might
well find that according force to judicial exercises of will is the only
way to preserve the Constitution's scheme for authentically appor-
tioned power.
The text of the U.S. Constitution, consisting at critical points of
"majestic generalities,"32 might be read as offering its expositors a
linguistic basis for elaborating the great moral ideas of liberty and
equality. The U.S. Supreme Court's elaboration of those ideas pro-
vides perhaps the most salient example of positive lawmaking in the
course of American constitutional adjudication. On its face, the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 33 provides a plausi-
ble textual basis for licensing courts to expound the nature of
equality. The Court's choice to treat the more obscure constitutional
guarantee of "due process"'34 as a linguistic invitation to expound "lib-
erty," on the other hand, has been more controversial. 35 Some
commentators have treated the Ninth Amendment 36 as supplying
linguistic support for a general constitutional guarantee of liberty,
37
though this is arguably not the reading best supported by the amend-
32. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943).
33. "No state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
34. There are two "due process" clauses in the U.S. Constitution. Amendment V of
the United States Constitution ("No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law .... .") applies to the United States and amend-
ment XIV ("[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law . . . .") to the state governments. With few exceptions they
have been applied consistently with each other.
35. See, most prominently, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
36. "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed
to deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
37. See DANIEL A. FARBER, RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE "SILENT" NINTH AMEND-
MENT AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AMERICANS DON'T KNOw THEY HAVE (2007);
Randy E. Barnett, The Ninth Amendment: It Means What It Says, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1
(2006).
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ment's history, 38 and not one that the Court has ever clearly
endorsed. 3
9
The Constitution's guarantee of equal protection has been inter-
preted to guarantee equal treatment by the law, not just equal
application of the law.40 Expounding that guarantee has involved
American courts in the highly controvertible enterprise of deciding
which distinctions drawn in laws are morally acceptable and which
unacceptable. 41 The Constitution's insistence that no person be de-
prived of liberty "without due process of law" has, with less linguistic
basis, 42 been held by the Supreme Court to guarantee liberty out-
right,43 allowing courts to decide which freedoms are so important
that government is limited or precluded from removing those free-
doms. The case law expounding the clause moved meaning through
three stages.
The first stage of due process exposition saw judicial expositors
conclude, after some initial uncertainty,44 that the due process clause
constrained legislatures in their choice of content for enacted law.
Those early cases pointed to a limitation redolent of the Constitu-
tion's prohibitions of bills of attainder 45 and of cruel and unusual
punishments. 46 It was a limitation that implemented more compre-
38. See Laurence Claus, Protecting Rights from Rights: Enumeration, Disparage-
ment, and the Ninth Amendment, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 585 (2004); Kurt T. Lash, A
Textual-Historical Theory of the Ninth Amendment, 60 STAN. L. REV. 895 (2008); Kurt
T. Lash, The Lost Original Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 83 TEX. L. REV. 331
(2004).
39. Kurt T. Lash, The Lost Jurisprudence of the Ninth Amendment, 83 TEX. L.
REV. 597 (2005). Cf. Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479, 486-99 (1965) (Goldberg, J.,
joined by Warren, C.J. and Brennan, J., concurring).
40. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S 356, 369 (1886) ( "[Tihe equal protection of the
laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws.").
41. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S.
620 (1996).
42. The clause has its roots in chapter 39 of Magna Carta, which recited an array
of adverse government actions not to be done to any "free man.., except by the lawful
judgment of his peers or by the law of the land." The more general guarantee of due
process was in Magna Carta explicitly in the alternative to one particular procedure
for removing someone's life, liberty, or property, namely, "lawful judgment of his
peers." The first American state constitution adopted that phraseology: "[T]hat no
man be deprived of his liberty, except by the law of the land or the judgment of his
peers." VA. CONST., art. I, § 8 (1776). That clause could be satisfied by a jury verdict,
and "liberty" in the clause clearly just meant not being locked up. The alternative,
more general promise of due process would thus also appear to have been simply
about legally required procedures for deciding whether someone should be impris-
oned. "Liberty" was something that a jury could plausibly vote to remove-the term
was used in the narrow sense of freedom from jail, not in the quite distinct and sweep-
ing sense of freedom from legal restrictions on action.
43. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
44. See, e.g., Mayo v. Wilson, 1 N.H. 53, 57 (1817) (treating duly enacted legisla-
tion as necessarily due process of law).
45. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
46. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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hensively the separation-of-powers principle, later reflected in the
equal protection clause, that legislation should be general in charac-
ter, not targeted by legislators to kill, lock up, or take property from
particular disfavored individuals.4 7 Broader judicial power to protect
liberty and property from legislative encroachment was in this period
sometimes directly attributed to extra-textual natural rights.
48
Expounding the due process clause moved into a second stage
when American courts began holding that the clause precluded legis-
latures from impairing existing property rights even by general
legislation,49 a principle congruent with the protection for liberty pro-
vided more specifically in the Constitution's prohibition of ex post
facto laws.50 Laws could prevent property rights from arising in the
future, and could provide for loss of liberty or property based on fu-
ture conduct,51 but could not simply confiscate or imprison. But then
came stage three, in which courts began treating "liberty" in the
clause not just as a modest reference to being out of jail, but as an
expansive expression of freedom to live one's life free from unjustified
government regulation.5 2 So read, the clause condemns any govern-
ment restriction that the courts-and ultimately, five Justices of the
Supreme Court-consider morally unjustified. And so the law of lib-
erty and equality in America is now, in large measure, ultimately
created and shaped by the Supreme Court.
Those who consider such open-ended moral decision-making an
inapt allocation of power to courts have expressed their concern, in
part, as following from theories of interpretive morality. Prominent
in this context are principles of so-called originalist interpretation
that require judges to take the meaning of a constitutional rule as
fixed at the moment of its promulgation. But originalism does not
necessarily obviate broad moral decision-making that in turn makes
law for the nation. The most prominent and widely-endorsed contem-
porary theory of originalism, "original public meaning originalism,"
calls for interpretation to be based on the meaning that the language
of the Constitution had for a (variously defined) typical American
47. See, e.g., Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 581 (1819) (submis-
sions of Daniel Webster); Hoke v. Henderson, 15 N.C. 1, 14-15 (1833) (Ruffin, C.J.).
48. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 387-89 (1798) (Chase, J.). Cf. id. at
398-99 (Iredell, J., concurring). See also Wilkinson v. Leland, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 627, 657
(1829) (Story, J.); Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43, 52 (1815) (Story, J.);
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 135-36 (1810) (Marshall, C.J.).
49. See Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378 (1856).
50. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. At an early date the
Supreme Court held this provision to apply only to retroactive imposition or enhance-
ment of criminal penalties. Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 386.
51. Cf. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 450 (1856) (Taney, C.J.),
which signaled that even future conduct (in that case, bringing a slave into a free
state) might not always be sufficient ground for removing property rights.
52. See, e.g., Allgeyer, v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897) (affirming, unanimously,
the "liberty to contract").
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reader or speaker of English at the time of enactment. 53 This ap-
proach draws support from the fact that we make law as a
community to serve an essentially predictive function, and that law
cannot fulfill that function if it lacks meaning-fixedness across its au-
dience community and over time. But the original public meaning of
"equal protection," for example, provides enormous opportunities for
judicial legislation insofar as it hands to expositors the job of decid-
ing, without much restriction, which distinctions morally matter.
Likewise, the original public meaning of the Second Amendment's
"right to bear arms"'54 hands to the courts the chance for elaborative
decision-making about which weapons count as "arms."55 In identify-
ing original public meaning, one can no more justify limiting "equal
protection" to prohibiting race discrimination than one can justify
limiting "arms" to muskets.
The apparent judicial discretion to legislate national morality en-
tailed by original public meaning interpretation is less obvious in a
different strain of originalism, which we might call intentionalism,
and which identifies the original meaning with the meaning the text
had for the actual enactors of a constitutional provision (as opposed
to the hypothetical community member of public meaning original-
ism). 56 Intentionalism might appear a more appealing interpretive
principle for those who wish to limit the Constitution's reach to some-
thing resembling the "original expected application"
57  of
constitutional guarantees. In order to ascertain the intended mean-
ing, this approach calls for consulting, among other sources,
legislative history to a degree that English common law courts de-
clined to do until 1992.58 But confining meaning to original expected
application need not be the consequence of intentionalism, depending
53. See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRE-
SUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2004); ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (1997); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CON-
STRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING (1999); KEITH E.
WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL IN-
TENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (1999); Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism 120
(Illinois Public Law Research Paper No. 07-24, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract= 1120244. Various specifications for the typical reader have been posited in
the literature. See Richard S. Kay, Original Intention and Public Meaning in Consti-
tutional Interpretation, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 703, 721-23 (2009).
54. "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the
right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." U.S. CONST. amend.
II.
55. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S.Ct. 2783 (2008).
56. See, e.g., Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitu-
tional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 226 (1988).
57. See Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT.
291, 293 (2007); Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption,
24 CONST. COMMENT. 427 (2007).
58. See Pepper v. Hart [1992] A.C. 593 (H.L.) (U.K.). Public meaning originalists
also consult drafting and ratification history, but they do so to gather evidence of
usage in the period of enactment. See Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The
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on what was intended by those whose views intentionalists think we
should care about. Choice to express oneself at a level of abstraction
above one's concrete concerns suggests an intention to address future
counterparts to those concerns, counterparts perhaps not yet ade-
quately appreciated at the time of enactment. The Second
Amendment's adopters could have explicitly confined themselves to
the weapons that they personally valued. The Fourteenth Amend-
ment's adopters could have explicitly confined themselves to the
particular immoral discrimination that was bothering them. They
chose, instead, to express themselves at a higher level of abstraction.
Whether or not that choice of language reflected a decision to dele-
gate broad elaborative discretion to later expositors is itself a
historical fact, one that intentionalist interpreters need to
investigate.
The debate between proponents of intentionalism and propo-
nents of original public meaning may ultimately turn on differing
perceptions of the nature and function of law. Particularly relevant is
the question whether lawmakers have "authority" in the sense of
moral right to be obeyed. One of us finds moral support for intention-
alism in widely-endorsed notions about what creates a moral duty to
obey the U.S. Constitution,59 while the other of us favors original
public meaning on the basis that law is, in Holmes' terms, just a body
of "systematized prediction. '60 On that view, notions of lawgivers'
moral right to be obeyed are superfluous to law's true nature.61
In any event, theories of morality in interpretation have not had
much effect in constraining the courts, which have, as the examples
given illustrate, appropriated a wide range of fundamental social and
political decision-making. What else might constrain? For much of its
history, the U.S. Congress has been dubiously treated as having
power to create "Exceptions" to the Supreme Court's jurisdiction to
decide constitutional questions.62 But this alleged ability to deprive
Interpretive Force of the Constitution's Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113,
1118 (2003).
59. See Kay, supra note 53, passim.
60. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457, 458
(1897) ("lay[ing] down some first principles for the study of this body of dogma or
systematized prediction which we call the law . . ").
61. Laurence Claus, The Empty Idea of Authority, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1301.
62. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. For a range of views on the scope of the
power, see MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION
OF JUDICIAL POWER, 24-45 (2d ed. 1990); Akhil Reed Amar, Article III and the Judici-
ary Act of 1789: The Two-Tiered Structure of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 138 U. PA. L.
REV. 1499 (1990); Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating
the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205 (1985); Charles L. Black,
Decision According to Law, 37-39 (1981); Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, The
Unitary Executive, Jurisdiction Stripping, and the Hamdan Opinions: A Textualist
Response to Justice Scalia, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1002 (2007); Laurence Claus, The One
Court that Congress Cannot Take Away: Singularity, Supremacy, and Article III, 96
GEO. L.J. 59 (2007); Laurence Claus, Constitutional Guarantees of the Judiciary: Ju-
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the Court of constitutional lawmaking power has lain largely in des-
uetude, thanks to Congress's need for judicial policing of the
Constitution's apportionment of powers. That apportionment be-
tween Congress, the President, and the state governments, must be
the subject of elaborative judicial lawmaking regardless of the Con-
stitution's linguistic vagueness. Umpiring the apportionment of
power among American government institutions has rendered the
Supreme Court's expositions of the Constitution an indispensable
feature of American public life. When the issue is which of multiple
competing elected government actors is allowed to act, the Justices
lack the option of being pervasively pro-democratic "minimalists"
who routinely resolve vagueness and ambiguity in favor of the valid-
ity of action by elected institutions. 63 However unclear the
Constitution, the Court must decide who gets to act, and its decisions
must succeed in affecting what the competing actors do. The Ameri-
can system of separated branches and levels of government cannot
otherwise survive.
Secure in its almost universally recognized indispensability, the
Supreme Court has elaborated with similar latitude upon the consti-
tutional vaguenesses and ambiguities that concern relations between
government and the individual. For the most part, Congress has not
been tempted to truncate the Court's jurisdiction to do this. The ex-
ceptional circumstances in which Congress has seriously threatened
use of its "Exceptions" power have been occasions on which the Court
had protected, or looked likely to protect, "discrete and insular minor-
risdiction, Tenure, and Beyond, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 459, 460-76 (2006); Barry
Friedman, A Different Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Congress and Federal Jurisdic-
tion, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 1 (1990); Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail
Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L.
REV. 895 (1984); John Harrison, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of
Federal Courts and the Text of Article III, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 203, 243-44 (1997);
Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts:
An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1365 (1953); Daniel J. Meltzer, The
History and Structure ofArticle III, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1569 (1990); James E. Pfander,
Marbury, Original Jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court's Supervisory Powers, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 1515 (2001); James E. Pfander, Jurisdiction-Stripping and the Su-
preme Court's Power to Supervise Inferior Tribunals, 78 TEx. L. REV. 1433, 1455 n.8
(2000); Lawrence Gene Sager, The Supreme Court 1980 Term, Foreword: Constitu-
tional Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal
Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17 (1981); Herbert Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitu-
tion, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1005-06 (1965).
63. James Bradley Thayer argued that the Supreme Court should resolve consti-
tutional underdeterminacy in favor of the validity of Congressional action, but that
the Court should accord no comparable favor to state government action. See James
B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7
HARv. L. REV. 129, 150, 154-55 (1893). Thayerian minimalism rests, then, not on def-
erence to democratic choice, but on whether institutions enjoy coordinate status with
the Court. On that premise, how should the Court resolve demarcation disputes be-
tween the Court's two elected coordinates?
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ities" 64 from government action. Until recently, Congress's most
notorious use of the power was to strip the Court of jurisdiction to
hear challenges to federal measures of doubtful constitutionality
adopted in the wake of the American Civil War.65 In this century and
decade, the "Exceptions" power has been invoked in Congress in con-
nection with proposals to stop the Court hearing claims from aliens,
66
atheists,67 and gay people. 68 Notwithstanding substantial support for
some of these measures, the breadth of the Supreme Court's jurisdic-
tion has escaped largely untouched. Measured by durability and
depth of influence in shaping constitutional values, the Justices may
well be the most powerful sitting lawmakers in the nation.
III. ENFORCING JUDICIAL LEGISLATION
The impressive enterprise of positive lawmaking by American
courts in the course of constitutional adjudication has, necessarily,
raised questions about how to enforce the resulting law. Kelsen ex-
pected enforcement of "negative" law that emerged from
constitutional courts to be fairly straightforward. The condemned
measure would be erased from the statute book, just as if it had been
repealed by the legislature.
The American constitutional experience, however, has shown
that complexities arise when enforcing even decisions that simply
hold legislative acts invalid. There has been controversy, for example,
concerning the effect that such decisions have on the legal status of
actions taken pursuant to law before that law's invalidation.69 Under
64. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (Stone, J.,
opinion of the Court).
65. Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869).
66. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 §§ 1005(e), 1005(h); Military Commissions
Act of 2006 § 7. The Court's decisions holding aspects of the Acts invalid did not di-
rectly address the reach of the "Exceptions" power. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S.
557 (2006); Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S.Ct. 2229 (2008).
67. Pledge Protection Act of 2004 § 2 (passed by the House of Representatives as
H.R. 2028 on Sept. 23, 2004) and Pledge Protection Act of 2005 § 2 (introduced to the
House of Representatives and Senate respectively as H.R. 2389 and S. 1046 on May
17, 2005) (purporting to eliminate the Supreme Court's jurisdiction to determine the
constitutionality of the Pledge of Allegiance as defined in 4 U.S.C. § 4 or of that
pledge's recitation). See also Constitution Restoration Act of 2005 § 101 (introduced to
the House of Representatives and Senate respectively as H.R. 1070 and S. 520 on
Mar. 3, 2005) (purporting to eliminate the Supreme Court's jurisdiction to determine
the constitutionality of government actors' "acknowledgment of God as the sovereign
source of law, liberty, or government").
68. Marriage Protection Act of 2004 § 2 (passed by the House of Representatives
as H.R. 3313 on July 22, 2004) and Marriage Protection Act of 2005 § 2 (introduced to
the House of Representatives as H.R. 1100 on Mar. 3, 2005) (purporting to eliminate
the Supreme Court's jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of the Defense of
Marriage Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C).
69. A related question attaches to the case of a statute held invalid in a judgment
subsequently overruled. Does the law in question spring back into life or is a new
enactment necessary? The Supreme Court, to the extent it has considered the ques-
tion, seems to have assumed such a statute is once more automatically effective. See
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the classic understanding of constitutional judicial review derived
from Marbury v. Madison, a judgment of unconstitutionality holds
that the unconstitutional enactment was, contra Kelsen, never law at
all. This orthodox view was expressed in a nineteenth century deci-
sion of the U.S. Supreme Court: "An unconstitutional act is not a law;
it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it
creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as
though it had never been passed."70 The unsettling results of such a
policy with respect to actions undertaken in reliance on an appar-
ently valid law have persuaded the Supreme Court to abandon this
absolute rule. It will now, sometimes, declare its holdings to operate
only prospectively, based on an evaluation of the particular interests
of individuals, society, and the legal system.71 This kind of holding, of
course, makes the legislative character of the judicial action dramati-
cally clear.
72
The remedial complexities of negative judicial lawmaking are
minor, however, when compared with those that attend the judicial
creation of legal rules. When a legislature creates a body of law, it is
in a position to provide the means by which that law is to be made
effective. The new scheme may use existing agencies of law adminis-
tration and enforcement, or create new ones. It may also provide the
necessary resources by appropriating public funds and raising new
revenues. Sometimes, as when conduct is regulated by criminal sanc-
tion, the existing law enforcement and criminal justice system may
be adequate. But in other situations, as has been the case, for exam-
ple, with respect to new rules protecting the environment, a large
new bureaucratic apparatus may be required.7 3 In contrast, the in-
strumentalities of administration and enforcement available to
judicial legislators are radically limited. It is for this reason that Kel-
Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1870). The issue is discussed in William
Michael Treanor & Gene B. Sperling, Prospective Overruling and the Revival of "Un-
constitutional" Statutes, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1902 (1993).
70. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442 (1886).
71. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 197-201 (1973).
72. "That concept is quite foreign to the American legal and constitutional tradi-
tion. It would have struck John Marshall as an extraordinary assertion of raw power
.... Fully retroactive decisionmaking was considered a principal distinction between
the judicial and the legislative power: '[Ilt is said that that which distinguishes a
judicial from a legislative act is, that the one is a determination of what the existing
law is in relation to some existing thing already done or happened, while the other is
a predetermination of what the law shall be for the regulation of all future cases.' T.
Cooley, Constitutional Limitations *91." Harper v. Va. Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86,
106-07 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting in part).
73. Alexandra B. Klass, Modern Public Trust Principles: Recognizing Rights and
Integrating Standards, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 699, 719-20 (2006) (discussing the
creation of agencies to implement environmental laws). See generally PETER L.
STRAuss, TODD D. RAKOFF, CYNTHIA R. FARINA & WALTER GELLHORN, GELLHORN AND
BysE's ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS 13-23 (Robert C. Clark ed., 10th
ed. 2003).
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sen dismissed the potential for judicial enforcement of positive
constitutional rights.74 The way in which judicially-created rules
have been implemented in the United States has been deeply affected
by the courts' institutional limitations.
75
Much depends, of course, on the kind of law the courts have
made. Some judge-made law regulates government actors who cannot
achieve their goals without judicial confirmation. In such cases, those
other officials must comply with the judicial legislation or risk failing
in their objectives. The U.S. Supreme Court, invoking the Fourth,
Fifth, and Sixth Amendments to the Constitution, has created a
fairly detailed set of rules regulating the conditions for lawful search
and arrest in connection with investigating and prosecuting crime.
These decisions have resulted in a substantial and relatively complex
body of law controlling police behavior.76 The means for assuring the
effectiveness of this law are direct and obvious. Courts may simply
reverse the convictions of defendants who have been treated other
than in accordance with the judicially produced rules. 77 Law enforce-
ment agencies interested in securing convictions, therefore, have an
interest in compliance. To a very significant extent, police depart-
ments have adopted procedures and trained their personnel to follow
these rules-a result familiar to any viewer of American television
police dramas.
78
Judicial lawmaking is not so easy to implement when it relates
to behavior that does not contemplate some subsequent judicial pro-
cess. It may happen that, upon a statement of the law by a court, the
relevant actors, and especially the holders of government power, will
conform their behavior to the rules announced. Sometimes, moreover,
74. See KELSEN, supra note 10, at 262.
75. The most famous summary of the limited abilities of the courts is Alexander
Hamilton's in The Federalist No. 78, noting that the judiciary has "no influence over
either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of
the society; and can take no active resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have
neither Force nor Will, but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the
aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments." See THE FEDERALIST
No. 78, supra note 30.
76. See JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PRO-
CEDURE, 149-89 (2006).
77. This is a substantial simplification of the actual practice. Not every deviation
from the prescribed procedures results in a reversal of the subsequent conviction. One
important qualification is the "harmless error" rule whereby a conviction may be af-
firmed if the reviewing court concludes that it would have resulted even if the police
had acted properly. See id. at 44. On the uncertain status of these rules in the Ameri-
can legal hierarchy see Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court 1974 Term,
Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1975).
78. See Myron W. Orfield, Jr., The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence: An Empiri-
cal Study of Chicago Narcotics Officers, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1016 (1987) (discussing
changes in police training and record-keeping in response to judicial constitutional
rulings); Corey Fleming Hirokawa, Comment, Making the "Law of the Land" the Law
on the Street: How Police Academies Teach Evolving Fourth Amendment Law, 49 EM-
ORY L.J. 295 (2000) (same).
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elected legislators will re-enact the court's law in statutory form. The
Supreme Court's various and changing pronouncements on the death
penalty (whose implementation does require some judicial confirma-
tion) have generally been followed by conforming legislation.
79
Indeed, in the United States, respect for, and deference to, the consti-
tutional mandates of the courts is much more the norm than the
exception.8 0 Judges have come to learn, however, that adequate co-
operation is not always forthcoming. In such situations, the question
arises as to how the judges, lacking the powers of "the sword or the
purse," may give substance to the law declared.
This issue has to be seen against the background of Anglo-Ameri-
can law concerning remedies available to successful litigants. That
law is, in part, a product of the historic division between courts of
common law and courts of equity. Generally speaking, in noncriminal
proceedings at common law, courts were limited to remedies reaching
the property of the defendant, whereas courts of equity could act "on
the person," ordering even a non-governmental defendant to act or to
refrain from acting. From the uneasy coexistence of these systems
there eventually emerged a practice whereby resort to equity-and
the in personam relief it offered-was available only when remedies
at law were deemed inadequate to redress the violation of the plain-
tiffs rights.8 ' When, in the last century, both law and equity were
lodged in unitary court systems, the priority of remedies was, at least
formally, retained. Equitable remedies, including injunctions decree-
ing a course of conduct by the defendant, were treated as exceptional,
to be granted only where law damages were inadequate and, even
then, only in the discretion of the court.
8 2
The preference for damages remedies raised obvious difficulties
in the enforcement of constitutional law in which the wrongs involved
so often resist pecuniary measurement. Moreover, until about fifty
years ago, an action for money damages premised on a violation of
constitutional rights was generally unavailable in federal courts.
8 3
The quintessential relief accorded in constitutional cases, exemplified
in Marbury v. Madison, was, as we have seen, the negative one of
79. Christine Holdeman, Sandi Mather & Judith A. Young, Case Note, Roper v.
Simmons: The Death Penalty Was Banned for Juvenile Offenders, 35 LINCOLN L. REV.
43, 43 (2007) (noting that thirty-five states amended their death penalty statutes af-
ter the Supreme Court's first major decision in 1972).
80. For a survey of the history of Congressional resistance and acquiescence see
Charles G. Geyh, Judicial Independence, Judicial Accountability, and the Role of Con-
stitutional Norms in Congressional Regulation of the Courts, 78 IND. L.J. 153 (2003).
81. See HENRY L. McCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF EQUiTY, 25-26 (1936).
82. See Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 506-11 (1959). Among
the factors weighing against the exercise of such discretion is the need for continuous
supervision by the court of any decrees that might be issued. See McCLINTOCK, supra
note 81, at 94.
83. Such an action was not recognized as authorized by federal statute law until
1961. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
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finding an unconstitutional act to be without legal effect. Still, the
judicial power created in Article III of the Constitution extended to
"all cases, in law and equity, arising under this Constitution [and]
laws of the United States," suggesting the availability of equitable
relief in proper cases. In the early part of the twentieth century, fed-
eral courts began issuing injunctions against state officials to bar the
enforcement of unconstitutional state laws.8 4 Such orders were, how-
ever, clearly inadequate to redress constitutional violations that
required affirmative changes in the way a state operated. The extent
to which U.S. courts have exploited their equitable powers to move
beyond prohibitory to mandatory relief is one of the most striking de-
velopments in modern constitutional law.
We begin our account of this phenomenon with the Supreme
Court's momentous judgments in Brown v. Board of Education. In
1954, the Court held that racial segregation in public education was a
denial of the "equal protection of the laws" which, under the Four-
teenth Amendment, no state was to deny to any person within the
state's jurisdiction.8 5 At the time of the decision, racially segregated
schools operated in thousands of districts, affecting tens of thousands
of children in twenty states and the District of Columbia.8 6 Under the
best circumstances, the necessary reassignment of students and per-
sonnel would have been complicated. But, as the Court knew well,
circumstances were far from the best. The decision in Brown would
be bitterly resented and resisted by much of the white population of
the American south. The Justices understood that it would take more
than a declaration of law to end the dual system of education.8 7
The case was argued before the Supreme Court in December
1952, but in June 1953 the Court issued an order setting the case for
reargument the following term and asking the parties to address five
questions set by the Court. Questions four and five dealt with the
content of any decree the Court might issue should it find segregation
unconstitutional. Should that decree order that African-American
children "forthwith be admitted to schools of their choice" or should
the court "in the exercise of its equity powers, permit an effective
gradual adjustment" to unitary systems? And if the latter course
were chosen, should the Court "formulate detailed decrees? '8 8 Not-
withstanding these inquiries and the parties' responses to them,
when the Supreme Court, in May 1954, declared racial segregation
84. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
85. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
86. See CHARLES T. CLOTFELTER, AFTER BROWN: THE RISE AND RETREAT OF
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION, 14-22 (2004).
87. The unwillingness of other government actors to implement fully a mere judi-
cial declaration of law was a critical factor leading courts to undertake the kind of
extensive managerial functions discussed in this section. For a sensitive discussion
see Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585 (1983).
88. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 345 U.S. 972, 972 (1953).
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incompatible with the Fourteenth Amendment, it again postponed
formulating a remedial order and set down the question for further
argument.8 9 The Court did not issue its decree in the case until May
1955, two and one-half years after the initial argument.90
The Court's opinion in this second Brown opinion displays an ob-
vious uncertainty as to what exactly should happen next. It plainly
declined to treat the case as ordinary. Rather than particularized re-
lief, the Court foresaw a "transition to a system of public education
freed from racial discrimination." This was going to be a process, not
an event. Although the "primary responsibility" belonged to local
school authorities, their actions would be subject to "judicial ap-
praisal" by lower courts applying "equitable principles":
Traditionally, equity has been characterized by a practical
flexibility in shaping its remedies and by a facility for adjust-
ing and reconciling public and private needs .... At stake is
the personal interest of the plaintiffs in admission to public
schools as soon as practicable on a nondiscriminatory basis.
To effectuate this interest may call for elimination of a num-
ber of obstacles .... Courts of equity may properly take into
account the public interest in the elimination of such obsta-
cles in a systematic and effective manner .... To that end,
the courts may consider problems related to administration,
arising from the physical condition of the school plant, the
school transportation system, personnel, revision of school
districts and attendance areas into compact units to achieve
a system of determining admission to the public schools on a
nonracial basis . . . .During this period of transition, the
courts will retain jurisdiction of these cases. 91
The Brown cases were remanded to the trial courts with instruc-
tions to issue orders to the states to admit the plaintiffs to public
schools on a nondiscriminatory basis not "forthwith," but "with all
deliberate speed."92 This obscure prescription implicitly recognized
that the Court's judgment amounted to the promulgation of a new
national policy to apply across a wide variety of circumstances and
into an extended future. Implementing that policy required the ma-
chinery of law administration and enforcement. In a memorandum to
his colleagues while the case was under consideration, Justice Felix
Frankfurter noted that the decree "would be radically different from
decrees enforcing merely individual rights . . . ," for the Court would
be, "broadly speaking, promoting a process of social betterment ...
89. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495-96 (1954).
90. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
91. Id. at 300-01.
92. Id.
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[S]preading the adjustment over time will more effectively accom-
plish the desired end .... ,,93
The subsequent history of the desegregation of schools in the
United States bore out the expectation implicit in the Supreme
Court's decision. Desegregation was a painfully slow process. By one
count, in 1963, almost a decade after the Court's initial pronounce-
ment, only 1.06% of African-American children in the South attended
school with whites.94 By that time the federal courts, and the Su-
preme Court in particular, began to understand that the complex
process of readjustment could not be left to the local school authori-
ties, the defendants in the desegregation cases. An important turning
point was reached in 1968 in Green v. County School Board.95 The
local school district had responded to a desegregation action by adopt-
ing a "freedom-of-choice" attendance policy honoring any student's
request to change schools. But after three years, the previously all
black school was still all black although some African-American stu-
dents had enrolled in the previously white school. The Supreme
Court declared that the order in Brown obliged any school board that
had operated a "dual system . . . to take whatever steps might be
necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimina-
tion would be eliminated root and branch.'96 It was not enough, that
is, to discontinue the policies that had led to unconstitutional segre-
gation. The school district had to "undo" the segregation that those
policies had created. 97 The district was obliged to take further mea-
sures, such as creating compulsory attendance zones, that would
eliminate the racial character of the system.98 Supervising courts had
to evaluate the measures taken "in light of the facts at hand and in
light of any alternatives which may be shown as feasible and more
promising in their effectiveness." District courts "should retain juris-
diction until it is clear that state-imposed segregation has been
completely removed."99
93. Quoted in RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V.
BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 866-67 (1975).
See also MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 313 (2004) ("The justices chose vagueness
and gradualism."). In argument before the Court, Thurgood Marshall, one of the coun-
sel for the plaintiffs in Brown, and later a Justice of the Supreme Court, argued for an
order setting a fixed date for full desegregation no later than one year after the judg-
ment: "I submit that a longer period would get the lower court into the legislative field
... ." Doug Rendleman, Brown Ii's "All Deliberate Speed" at Fifty: A Golden Anniver-
sary or a Mid-Life Crisis for the Constitutional Injunction as a School Desegregation
Remedy? 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1575, 1585 (2004).
94. Some of the statistics are collected in KLARMAN, supra note 93, at 344-63.
95. Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
96. Id. at 437-38 (emphasis added).
97. Id. at 440 (quoting the dissenting opinion in the Court of Appeals).
98. Id. at 441-42.
99. Id. at 439.
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What this would mean for the ongoing involvement of courts in
administering desegregation plans became clear three years later in
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education.100 The Su-
preme Court approved a detailed decree issued by a district court,
based on the recommendation of an expert in educational administra-
tion. The Supreme Court endorsed decrees calling for such measures
as designing oddly shaped attendance zones, pairing or clustering of
black and white schools to produce better racial balance, compulso-
rily transporting students to schools outside their neighborhoods,
reassigning teachers and other personnel to reduce the racial speci-
ficity of individual schools, and requiring that new schools be
constructed in locations that would not contribute to the persistence
of segregation. 10 1 All of these tools, however, were to be employed
with discretion and sensitivity to the particular conditions present in
a particular time and place, taking into account both "individual and
collective interests.' °2
Over the following twenty years, federal courts repeatedly had to
reconcile the constitutional imperative with the practical realities of
operating a school system, a task often made more difficult by the
passive or active resistance of the local authorities. The practical and
political questions associated with managing a desegregation regime
returned regularly to the Supreme Court, whose subsequent judg-
ments were largely concerned with defining limits on the broad
judicial mandate sketched out in Brown, Green, and Swann. The
kinds of issues involved were illustrated by the Supreme Court's
judgment in Missouri v. Jenkins10 3 in 1995, one of the Court's last
significant statements on the remedial authority of federal courts in
desegregation cases. The district court in that case had found that
unconstitutional segregation had affected the quality of the education
offered in the schools in issue. Over a ten-year period, the district
court judge had, consequently, ordered that class sizes be reduced,
that a full-time kindergarten be instituted, that summer programs be
expanded, that before and after school tutoring be provided, and that
an early childhood development program be established. The district
court also ordered a major capital improvement program and salary
increases for teachers and other school employees.' 0 4 The Supreme
Court held that, since many of these actions sought to remedy a ra-
cial disparity among school districts, they were not part of a proper
100. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
101. Id. at 19-25.
102. Id. at 16. The court quoted Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329-30 (1944)
for the proposition that equity was an "instrument for nice adjustment and reconcilia-
tion between the public interest and private needs as well as competing private
claims."
103. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995).
104. Id. at 74-80.
99
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remedy for the constitutional violation that had been found within a
particular district.10 5
The issues emerging from the remedial approaches developed in
desegregation litigation suggest more general themes applicable
when constitutional courts make public law. What the substantive
constitutional prohibition of racial segregation required may have
seemed clear enough when Brown was decided in 1954. But the idea,
enunciated in Green, that an adequate remedy required eliminating
every "vestige" of discrimination meant that the supervising courts
had to determine what counted as vestiges, how vestiges could be
identified, and what measures were appropriate to eliminate them.
The desegregation cases have provided the remedial model for a
number of important categories of modern constitutional litigation.
The Eighth Amendment's prohibition of "cruel and unusual punish-
ments" has been the predicate for widespread constitutional
challenges to the operation of prisons. The same features we have
already noted-the need for extended time to reform facilities, the
technical complexities of institutional change, the uncertain out-
comes of alternative measures and the sometimes reluctant
compliance of the responsible officials-have resulted in long-term
supervision of numerous institutions. In litigation challenging the
constitutionality of aspects of Arkansas state correctional institu-
tions, federal judges ordered, among other things, that institutions
be closed, maximum numbers of inmates for particular facilities
and for individual cells, detailed procedures for determining discipli-
nary violations, and limits on the punishments administered. The
courts also required employment of full-time psychiatrists or psychol-
ogists, affirmative action to recruit more minority personnel, and
mandatory training of employees to improve race relations in the
prisons. The practice of using armed inmates as "trusty" guards was
prohibited. Inmates were to be provided with educational opportuni-
ties and a fair procedure for filing grievances. The courts retained
jurisdiction for more than ten years. 10 6 Mental hospitals have been
the subject of similar decrees 10 7 and, in somewhat more contained
105. Id. at 90-100.
106. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978) (dealing with limited aspects of the
case). Details and citations are set forth in MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN,
JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE MODERN STATE: How THE COURTs REFORMED
AMERICA'S PRISONS 59-74 (1998).
107. Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (1972). See Jules B. Gerard, A Restrained
Perspective on Activism, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 605, 613 (1988) ("The full flavor of the
order he did enter is impossible to capture in a summary. It covers eight printed pages
and is divided into five major sections. Beside definitions, it contains thirty-five
paragraphs, some with as many as sixteen subparagraphs, and some subparagraphs
with as many as five sub-subparagraphs. It lists thirty-five different kinds of employ-
ees, ranging from psychiatrists and psychologists to messengers and vehicle drivers,
and how many of each, every Alabama institution was ordered to have on its staff. It
contains detailed instructions with respect to physical facilities-how hot the water
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proceedings, so has the process of apportioning legislative
representation. 108
Remedial measures of this scope and complexity, especially when
combined with such procedural innovations as class actions, flexible
rules on joinder of parties, and liberal standing requirements for as-
sociations, constitute a new category of judicial action. In an
influential article published in 1976, Abram Chayes contrasted the
attributes of "public law litigation" with those of traditional adjudica-
tion. The object in the new actions was not the well-defined
settlement of a discrete dispute between identified parties. It was
"not a terminal, compensatory transfer, but an effort to devise a pro-
gram to contain future consequences in a way that accommodates the
range of interests involved."' 0 9 Chayes made clear how these decrees
blurred the difference between adjudication and legislation:
The whole process begins to looks like the traditional
description of legislation: Attention is drawn to a "mischief,"
existing or threatened, and the activity of the parties and
court is directed to the development of on-going measures
designed to cure that mischief. Indeed, if, as is often the
case, the decree sets up an affirmative regime governing the
activities in controversy for the indefinite future and having
binding force for persons within its ambit, then it is not very
much of a stretch to see it as, pro tanto, a legislative act.110
An essential aspect of this development was the elimination or
even reversal of the historic priority of legal over equitable remedies.
In this category of litigation, at least, the primary remedy is the in-
junction. Courts often choose, moreover, not a simple command to do
or refrain from doing a particular act. Rather, as exemplified by the
desegregation cases, they issue continuing injunctions directed at a
vaguely expressed goal. They allow for repeated recourse to further
judicial review for modification as circumstances change, or as one or
another solution proves inadequate to the long-term elimination of
the objectionable conditions."' The result, at least sometimes, is
must be (11OF at the fixture), for example. And so on-and on." (citing Wyatt, at
379-86)).
108. See Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254 (2003) (upholding a district court injunc-
tion ordering adoption of a Congressional district reapportionment plan of the district
court's own devising).
109. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L.
REV. 1281, 1294 (1976).
110. Id. at 1297.
111. See id. at 1292. See generally, OWEN M. Fiss, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION
(1978). Fiss posited the utility of the "structural injunction, which seeks to effectuate
the reorganization of an ongoing social institution." Id. at 7.
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what Donald Horowitz has called a "chameleon case, ever-new, ever-
changing, never-ending."
112
The actual management of such remedial regimes necessarily oc-
curs in the trial courts, although, as we have seen, their orders are
subject to periodic correction by appellate tribunals. The administra-
tive and bureaucratic functions of the trial courts are, in that way,
manifestations of the lawmaking activities of the appellate courts.
Even more than occurs in modern legislatures, much of the lawmak-
ing by American courts in constitutional litigation involves
promulgating broad standards of constitutional conduct. 113 The lower
courts thus play a role analogous to that of administrative agencies in
giving specific shape to the "soft rights" they have been directed to
enforce. 114 Again, the lower courts' experiences working out the prac-
ticalities of the Supreme Court's general mandate to eliminate
racially segregated schools are exemplary.
The new remedial regimes have been sharply criticized for their
radical departure from the ordinary judicial role. Some of the critics
may have been motivated merely by disagreement with the substan-
tive changes that the courts have engineered. This was surely the
case with many of the shrillest complaints about the courts' involve-
ment in the desegregation of the schools. But some academic critique
focused distinctly on the redefinition of judicial authority that such
litigation has produced. According to those critics, such developments
transgressed the constitutionally defined limits of the judicial power
and involved an unwarranted assumption of both legislative and ex-
ecutive responsibility. 115 Some of the defenses of the expanded
judicial role helped to generate this concern. "Civil litigation," accord-
ing to an early and prominent proponent of structural reform
litigation, "is an institutional arrangement for using state power to
bring a recalcitrant reality closer to our chosen ideals."11 6 Critics
questioned whether the unambiguous evil of segregation and its leg-
acy was sufficient moral justification for catapulting the courts into
an essentially different institutional role. Given the breadth and com-
plexity of the issues involved, critics contended, courts were
112. Donald L. Horowitz, Decreeing Organizational Change: Judicial Supervision
of Public Institutions, 1983 DuKE L.J. 1265, 1297 (1983).
113. Michael Dorf draws a connection between broad, indeterminate legal norms
and "experimentalist" trial courts that creatively solve problems rather than merely
applying controlling rules, although he does not refer explicitly to the judicial admin-
istration of structural injunctions. See Michael C. Doff, Legal Indeterminacy and
Institutional Design, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 875, 885-87, 940-43 (2003).
114. See SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, supra note 20, at 99-103. While the subject of
this Report is limited to the law emerging from constitutional adjudication, the
greater part of "public law litigation" involves the attempted judicial enforcement of
personal rights arising from ordinary legislation. See generally id.
115. John Choon Yoo, Who Measures the Chancellor's Foot? The Inherent Remedial
Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 CAL. L. REv. 1121, 1144-71 (1996).
116. Owen M. Fiss, Comment, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1089 (1984).
502 [Vol. 58
2010] CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AS "POSITIVE LEGISLATORS" 503
necessarily making decisions without full benefit of argument on be-
half of all relevant interests, potentially compromising the
appearance of disinterestedness that supports judicial authority.
117
Critics charged, moreover, that even strictly in terms of achieving ju-
dicially-identified social progress, the courts were proving to be crude
and clumsy managers of institutional reform.-
18
Worries about judicial overreaching have sometimes manifested
themselves in legislative efforts to limit remedial decrees. The Civil
Rights Act of 1964 significantly increased the opportunities for judi-
cial intervention in school administration by authorizing the federal
government to initiate legal action against segregated systems. 11 9
Subsequently, however, Congress prescribed a set of priorities for
federal courts issuing desegregation orders, including limits on the
circumstances in which those courts may order the transportation of
students.' 20 Unhappiness with intervention in the operation of pris-
ons led to enactment of the Prison Litigation Reform Act in 1996.
That legislation limited federal court decrees in prisoner rights cases
to "narrowly drawn" relief employing "the least intrusive means nec-
essary to correct violation of the Federal right." The Act also set in
place various procedural devices to ensure that the supervising court
paid attention to the Act's limitations' 2' But insofar as we are deal-
ing with the implementation of legal rules promulgated by the courts
in the name of the Constitution, any attempt at legislative correction
that was found to thwart the effectiveness of those rules would itself
be unconstitutional.
2 2
In recent years, the Supreme Court has itself stressed the limits
rather than the reach of judicial remedial authority.123 Commenta-
tors perceive a significant reduction in the number of cases where
courts have retained supervisory authority over public institu-
tions. 124 It would be wrong, however, to conclude that public law
litigation and "structural injunctions" are now of mere historical sig-
117. See SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, supra note 20, at 123-38.
118. See Horowitz, supra note 112. This article remains one of the most perceptive
critical reviews of institutional public litigation. See also GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE
HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SociAL CHANGE? 30-36 (1991) (surveying
limitations to courts' ability to effect social reform); SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, supra
note 20, at 113-162. See generally Peter H. Schuck, Judging Remedies: Judicial Ap-
proaches to Housing Segregation, 37 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 289 (2002).
119. 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6(a).
120. Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1721, et seq.
121. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3626(a)-3626(b). A constitutional challenge to one of these de-
vices was rejected by the Supreme Court in Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327 (2000).
122. On whether Congress can preclude judicial findings of unconstitutionality, see
the range of views expressed at note 62, supra.
123. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 347 (1996); Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70
(1995).
124. See Myriam Gilles, An Autopsy of the Structural Reform Injunction: Oops ...
It's Still Moving!, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 143, 144 (2003); Wendy Parker, The Decline of
Judicial Decisionmaking: School Desegregation and District Court Judges, 81 N.C. L.
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nificance. Courts continue to be confronted with requests for specific
relief ordering the reform of public institutions alleged to be operat-
ing unconstitutionally. In July 2009, the U.S. Department of Justice
had a list of 208 "open cases" concerning the discriminatory adminis-
tration of public schools.
125
Some commentators have noted a change in the techniques of ju-
dicial control of public administration, whereby detailed
management has been replaced by more flexible processes that allow
the various "stakeholders" to participate in formulating methods of
reform. 126 But this is a far cry from the elimination of judicial author-
ity, final judicial authority, in determining the way government
operates in important sectors of public activity. The Supreme Court
has moderated, but it has never renounced, the kind of ongoing struc-
tural relief that we have described, despite the doubts of some of its
members. 127 It may, in fact, be fair to say that the role of the consti-
tutional judge as policymaker and potential administrator of public
institutions has now become a permanent feature of American consti-
tutional law.
REV 1623, 1626-44 (2003); Russell L. Weaver, The Rise and Decline of Structural
Remedies, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1617, 1623-28 (2004).
125. List on file with authors. We are grateful to John Brittain for providing this
information.
126. See Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public
Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARv. L. REV. 1016, 1067-73 (2004). "The judge's role
changes from that of directly determining the merits to facilitating a process of delib-
eration and negotiations among the stakeholders." Id. at 1055.
127. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 124-25 (Thomas, J. concurring). See also
id. at 112 (O'Connor, J. concurring) (expressing doubts about judicial capacity to man-
age institutional reform).
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